Bidder Preferences among Auction Institutions by Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta & Salmon, Tim
Bidder Preferences among Auction Institutions¤
Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzely
Humboldt University
Tim Salmonz
Florida State University
November 14, 2002
Abstract
This study examines bidder preferences between alternative auction institutions. In par-
ticular we seek to experimentally characterize the degree to which bidders prefer an ascending
auction over a sealed bid auction. We …nd very strong ceteris paribus preferences for the as-
cending institution with bidders choosing it overwhelmingly often when entry prices for the two
auctions are the same. When the entry prices of the two auctions di¤er, many subjects can
be shown to be willing to pay far more to enter the ascending auction than is explainable by
their risk attitudes when accounting for their expectations about the risk preferences of their
opponents.
JEL Codes: C91, D44
Key Words: bidder preferences, private values, sealed bid auctions, ascending auctions
¤The authors would like to thank various participants in seminars at Florida State University, University College
London, Max Planck Institute for Research into Economic Systems, and ESA Meeting 2002 for comments and advice.
We thank Mark Isaac and Sabine Kröger in particular for many helpful conversations and suggestions. Financial Sup-
port from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, SFB 373 (“Quanti…kation und Simulation ökonomischer Prozesse”),
Humboldt-University Berlin, is gratefully acknowledged. Complete sets of instructions for the experiments in this
paper are available upon request to the authors.
yHumboldt-University of Berlin, Department of Economics, Spandauer Str. 1, D-10178 Berlin, Germany, e-mail:
ivanova@wiwi.hu-berlin.de
zDepartment of Economics, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL, 32306-2180, tsalmon@garnet.acns.fsu.edu.
Phone: 850-644-7207 Fax: 850-644-4535.
1
1 Introduction
Auctions have become a pervasive method of exchange in the on-line world as each day thousands
of auctions take place online and this trade volume totals to billions of dollars worth of goods per
year1. This large volume of auction transactions implies the existence of a large number of sellers
competing for buyers. The obvious implication is that the competition among the sellers for the
pool of potential buyers can be …erce and any competitive edge a seller can …nd could be important.
One such competitive edge a seller might exploit is using an auction design that attracts bidders
away from their competitors.
When designing a real auction or modeling a theoretical one, this entry decision of prospective
bidders is rarely considered. Most auction analysis is performed assuming that a certain number
of bidders will participate for certain or perhaps that the number of bidders is unknown and
randomly determined. It should be clear however, that the most crucial part of a successful auction
is encouraging as many bidders as possible to participate. In general this should be expected to
have a positive e¤ect on revenue (at least in non-common value environments) and in certain types
of auctions it may help to combat the possibility of bidder collusion. Since there are typically
competing auctions available for similar goods or even outside options that bidders can pursue
when auctions are for unique goods, it is important to understand how the aspects of an auction
format can e¤ect a persons decision to enter.
Consider a bidder who is faced with the choice of entering one of two auctions for similar or
even identical objects. How does this bidder make his decision of which auction to enter? The
obvious answer is that the bidder will enter into the auction that maximizes their expected utility
so long as that expected utility is greater than some reservation value. The real question, then, is
how are these expected utilities constructed? Pro…t from participating in the auction is an obvious
argument. There are also a number of environmental considerations that might e¤ect this decision
that would be di¢cult to account for precisely such as the reputation and trustworthiness of the
1For a survey of the on-line auction activity see Lucking-Reiley (2000).
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auctioneer, quality of the advertisement for the auction and things of this nature. It is also possible
though that the format of the auction itself can have an impact on the preferences of the bidder.
This latter point will be the issue of this study. The particular focus will be looking at bidder
preferences between the two most common standard auction formats used in the …eld; the sealed
bid …rst price (will be abbreviated as just the “sealed bid” auction) and the ascending or English
auction. The other reason we are interested in comparing these two auction formats rather than
between the ascending and second price or …rst price and descending is that it seems reasonable to
expect bidders to have preferences between the two due to the strategic di¤erences between them.
Such di¤erences lead to substantial di¤erences in terms of the di¢culty of deciding how to bid and
also in the possibility that an outcome that leads to regret as in a …rst price auction one can lose
to a bid that is below one’s value potentially causing a bidder to regret having bid so low while
this should not happen in an ascending auction.
If one considers the situation of a bidder choosing between two auctions that di¤er only by
whether the auction is being conducted according to an ascending or sealed bid format, it is not
immediately obvious which would be the most preferred even assuming a standard symmetric
independent private values environment. Were the bidders risk neutral, then of course revenue
equivalence would hold and the bidders would be indi¤erent. If the bidders are risk averse, the
situation is more complex. As shown in Milgrom and Weber (1982), RA bidders will bid higher
in a sealed bid auction than risk neutral bidders and therefore expect to make a lower surplus
than if they participated in an ascending auction where they will bid identically to risk neutral
bidders. That would imply a preference for the ascending since the surplus if they win is higher.
On the other hand, the surplus in the ascending auction is more variable than the surplus in the
sealed bid and a RA decision maker dislikes a variable outcome causing the sealed bid to be more
attractive. These con‡icting attractions lead to a lack of a general conclusion about which format a
RA bidder would prefer. Matthews (1987) presents a solution to this dilemma by showing that if a
bidder possesses decreasing absolute risk averse (DARA) preferences, they will prefer the ascending,
increasing absolute risk averse (IARA) the sealed bid and constant absolute risk averse (CARA)
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preferences will lead to indi¤erence. These results will serve as a useful back-drop to the analysis
below.
There are several other empirical and theoretical papers that look at the issue of endogenous
entry choices in regard to auctions, Bajari and Hortacsu (2000), Lucking-Reiley (1999), Harstad
(1990), Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1993), Levin and Smith (1994), McAfee (1993) and McAfee and
McMillan (1987) to name a few. These papers are examining entry decisions in a context quite
di¤erent than we are concerned with here. In general, they are looking at either the decision of
whether to enter an auction or not, or at the choice of which auction to enter based upon the entry
price or reserve price being the main or even only characteristic upon which the auctions di¤er. Our
point of concern is to look at the entry decision when the main characteristic that distinguishes
two auctions is the format being used to conduct the auction and examine the preferences that
underlie those decisions. We note that in Klemperer (2002), the author discusses such preferences
and proposes that ascending auctions can actually discourage disadvantaged or weak bidders from
entering. We only consider symmetric bidders so the relative strengths of bidders is not an issue.
Klemperer’s claim is investigated in Goeree and O¤erman (2002) where they …nd that if weak
bidders are allowed to choose sequentially among themselves between entering an auction or playing
a …xed lottery, they tend to enter …rst price auctions more than ascending.
The most closely related prior study is Ivanova-Stenzel and Sonsino (2001). In this paper the
authors conduct an experiment comparing the outcomes in a “one-bid” auction, i.e. a standard
sealed bid …rst price auction, to a “two-bid” auction, a modi…ed version where subjects may submit
two bids: a high bid and a low one and the winner pays his low bid if this was higher than all
other bids. One of the issues they examined was which auction format the bidders preferred. They
accomplished this by allowing bidders in one part of the experiment to repeatedly choose between
participating in a one-bid auction competing with one other bidder or a two-bid auction against
one other player. The results showed a strong preference for the two-bid auction.
The one shortcoming in the methodology in Ivanova-Stenzel and Sonsino (2001) as a means
of measuring bidder preferences is that it only allowed for comparing auctions on what might be
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called a ceteris paribus basis. That is, with all things being equal, which auction would the bidders
prefer? If one wishes to use the results from a study of this sort to argue in favor of adopting a
new design, it would be useful to take the investigation a step further and measure the intensity
of this preference or …nd an answer to the question “how much are bidders willing to pay for their
preferred auction format?” The current study will extend the methodology in Ivanova-Stenzel and
Sonsino (2001) to explore this additional question in the context of bidder preferences between the
one-bid version of the …rst price auction and the standard ascending or English auction.
The outcome of these experiments will show the existence of very strong preferences for the
ascending auction. When subjects are given a choice between the …rst price and the ascending
auction on a ceteris paribus basis, they overwhelmingly choose the ascending auction. As expected,
the surplus achieved by the winners in the ascending auctions far exceeds the surplus obtained in
the sealed bid auctions. When the subjects are asked to pay to get into an ascending auction,
however, some are evidencing a willingness to pay that far exceeds what appear to be the most
appropriate theoretical predictions.
Section 2 of the paper will explain the design and conduct of the experiments. Section 3 contains
the analysis of results and section 4 will conclude. There is also an appendix to the paper which
contains some technical details relating to a few of the computations made in the analysis.
2 Design of Experiments
The experiments for this study were divided into two distinct phases. In the …rst phase, the learning
or training phase, the subjects played both a sealed bid and an ascending auction for 10 consecutive
rounds with each auction being conducted with two bidders. Each round consisted of the bidder
playing one of each auction type with the same value. The bidders possessed private values which
were randomly drawn from the set V = f0; 1; 2; ; :::99; 100g with all values vi 2 V being equally
likely. After seeing their value draw, subjects were asked to submit their bid to be used in the
sealed-bid auction. Subjects could choose integer bids between 0 and 150; which did allow them to
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overbid their highest possible value. All values were denoted in a …ctitious currency termed ECU
for Experimental Currency Unit. Before bidders were informed about the results of the sealed bid
auction, they participated in a Japanese or ascending clock auction2. At the end of the round the
bidders observed a feedback–window specifying the results from both auction formats indicating
whether or not they won, the price paid by the winner in each, the private value of the buyer,
their own pro…t in the auction and their total pro…t in the current round. They were not given
cumulative pro…t numbers, only numbers from the current round. There were 10 participants in
each experiment session and in each round, subjects were randomly re-paired to bid against a new
opponent. In a given round, subjects competed against the same opponent in both the ascending
and sealed bid auctions.
The idea for this phase was to allow subjects time to …gure out how to bid in these auctions
as well as to understand the formats well enough for them to form preferences between them. The
reason for having subjects play both auctions with the same value was an attempt to minimize
any negative impressions a bidder might receive about an auction format due to a random series
of bad draws on one format while getting good draws in the other. In four out of the six sessions,
at the end of the learning phase there was a summary screen detailing the average pro…t achieved
by the winner across both auction types. This screen was eliminated in two of the sessions. The
purpose of including this information screen was to aid subjects in learning about the average
actual pro…tability for participating in the two mechanisms and it was removed in the two sessions
to determine if it had any e¤ect.
In the second phase of the experiment, the preference assessment phase, the participants played
an extended auction-selection game for 30 rounds. In a single round of this phase, bidders were
asked to choose to enter either an ascending or sealed bid auction, knowing that regardless of which
they chose they would be competing against one other bidder3. In each round, both auction formats
2The price started at 0 and began increasing at the rate of 1 ECU every 2 seconds. The auction concluded when
one of the bidders clicked on a button to indicate they were withdrawing from the auction with the remaining bidder
winning the auction at the price the …rst bidder dropped out at.
3To guarantee that an even number of subjects participated in each mechanism, only 9 out of the 10 participants
were able to choose an auction type in each round. The 10-th participant was automatically assigned to whichever
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had an entry price attached to choosing them which the bidder had to pay regardless of whether
or not they won. This choice of which auction to enter was made before observing their realized
private value for the auction. In the …rst 10 rounds of this phase, the entry prices for both auction
formats (sealed bid and ascending) were the same (1:40 ECU). The preferred auction design was
identi…ed for each individual as the one they chose in at least 5 rounds of these 10 rounds. In the
remaining 20 rounds, the entry price for the preferred auction format was varied in each round
using a grid consisting of entry prices ranging from .7 to 14 ECU with an increment of .7. This
range was decided upon based on two pilot sessions to identify a reasonable range of values that
yielded …ne enough resolution to identify bidder preferences while still being wide enough to allow
the observation of the maximum willingness to pay of most subjects. To avoid the possibility that
the subjects would see the experiment as a simple grid exercise and become bored or disinterested,
the grid was not presented in an ascending order, rather the order was randomized. To make
the grid structure even less apparent, we added an ² to each element of the grid, where ² is a
random variable normally distributed on the range (¡:05; :05).4 There are other ways of eliciting
a subject’s willingness to pay such as running a second-price sealed bid auction for the right to
enter each format that some might be inclined to …nd more straightforward. There are, however,
two main advantages of our approach. The …rst is that it allows us to conduct consistency checks
on the elicited WTP through using this randomized grid. We are also able to use our results to
speci…cally test the e¤ect of entry prices on entry which is in itself an important issue for applied
auction design.
After subjects made their choices concerning the auction type, the round was played with 20%
probability. This was a session wide determination, not speci…c to any particular player. At the
end of each auction that was actually conducted, subjects were informed whether or not they won
the auction, the price paid by the winner, the entry price they paid, their private (reselling) value
auction type had an odd number of people selecting it. The identity of the “10-th” player was changed in each round,
so that each subject played the balancing role once every ten rounds or three times among the 30 rounds.
4The actual entry price order all subjects saw was {8.39, 2.10, 0.70, 4.92, 12.61, 1.42, 6.27, 4.20, 9.79, 11.15, 13.27,
5.59, 11.90, 9.07, 2.80, 10.49, 7.01, 3.50, 13.98, 7.74}.
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and their own payo¤ in the current round. Note that an entry price was only charged to a subject
if the auction was conducted. In the rounds in which no auction was conducted, no entry prices
were charged.
All experimental sessions were conducted with the use of a computer based software system,
created with z-Tree (Fischbacher (1998)). All experiments were conducted at Humboldt-University,
Berlin and most participants were students of economics or business administration. They had been
invited by lea‡ets to participate in an experiment announced to last about two hours which turned
out to be approximately accurate. The conversion rate of the ECU earned by each subject into
cash was: 1 ECU = 0.04 EUR or about US$0.035 (at the time the experiment was conducted).
In addition, subjects were paid a …xed participation fee of 2.50 EUR or about $2.20. Subjects’
total earnings ranged between 7.35 EUR ($6.47) to 26.60 EUR ($23.41) with a mean of 16.83 EUR
($14.81).
3 Results
There are three basic questions that arise from these experiments which are 1. What did people
prefer?, 2. How much were they willing to pay for that preference? and 3. What can account for
that willingness to pay? Each of these will be answered in order.
3.1 Which institution did subjects prefer?
When the entry prices for the two auction institutions were equal, subjects overwhelmingly preferred
the ascending auction. There was only one subject choosing the sealed bid exclusively while 39
chose the ascending exclusively. In fact only 5 out of the 60 subjects chose the sealed bid more
often than the ascending. The average number of times the ascending was chosen was 7.87 with a
median of 9 while the numbers were 1.13 and 0 for the sealed bid.
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3.2 How much were they willing to pay?
There are several di¤erent ways to look at how much the subjects were willing to pay for their
most preferred auction. Since only …ve subjects evidenced a preference for the sealed bid, we will
be ignoring willingness to pay for it and will concentrate on analyzing willingness to pay for the
ascending.
One characterization of this would be to construct a pseudo demand curve showing how many
people are willing to pay each possible entry price for the ascending auction. Such a construct is
shown in …gure 1. This pseudo demand curve exhibits the standard characteristics of a normal
demand curve. It shows that as the price rises, fewer people are willing to pay for the ascending
auction. It is a bit jagged, however, indicating that there are some bidders making choices that
are not purely monotonic. For example, a subject may have declined to pay a price of 2.1 for the
ascending auction, but agreed to pay a price of 2.8 or 3.5. This is also partially an artifact of not
allowing one person to choose at each price. For example, at one point we may observe 35 subjects
willing to pay a price of 2.1 and 36 willing to pay 2.8 because the person held out at 2.1 was willing
to pay that price and higher, then at the price of 2.8, he was allowed to choose and accepted that
price while one of the people not willing to pay at 2.1 were now held out.
Theoretically, expected pro…t would have been the same between both institutions had the
subjects bid as risk neutral expected utility maximizers. In reality, average pro…t to winners from
the ascending auctions was 37.02 and 19.78 for sealed bid5. This implies a di¤erence of 17. 24:
If subjects expected to win half the time, this implies an expected pro…t di¤erential of 17.24/2=
8. 62. The theoretical average pro…ts, or the pro…ts that would have been obtained had bidders
bid according to risk neutral Nash equilibrium bidding strategies, were 37.40 and 33.63 (37.64 and
33.28 for phase 1)6.
5These numbers are average pro…ts to winners from all auctions excluding any entry price payments, if we just
look at phase 1 numbers, the results are 37.02 and 19.32.
6The theoretically expected pro…ts for the ascending auction are a bit higher than they should be. This was due
to a degree of correlation somehow getting into the values for the two bidders. It is unlikely this was detectable by
the subjects and should have had little impact on their choice behavior. The most likely impact would have been to
increase the level of the price that leads to a switch-over from the ascending auction to the sealed bid, but results
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Figure 1: Pseudo demand curve indicating the number of subjects choosing the ascending
auction format at each entry price.
If bidders were concerned only with expected pro…tability, they should have been willing to pay
up to 8.62 on top of the entry price for the sealed bid auction, 1.4, or a total entry price of 10.
02 to be in the ascending versus the sealed bid auction. The horizontal dotted line in the demand
curve graph represents this cut-o¤ price. At this line, expected pro…ts from the two formats are
equal. Below this line, the subjects will be making less on average from participating in the sealed
bid auction. This indicates that fewer than 10 out of 60 people were willing to pay more than this
to participate in the ascending auction, most were only willing to pay far less.
To get a more precise picture of the willingness to pay of the subjects requires estimating their
switch-over price or the price at which the subjects would switch from choosing the ascending
auction to the sealed bid. The best way to understand this process is to visualize the price of
the two auctions starting o¤ the same, subjects choosing the ascending, and then the price of the
ascending slowly rising. At some point, the subject will being choosing the sealed bid. We want to
…nd the price that best describes the point at which each subject …nds the ascending auction no
will show that experiential variables such as this have no e¤ect on the switch-over price.
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longer worthwhile to choose. To to that we will propose that there exists some price di¤erential, ±i;
that will lead to the subject to switch from choosing the ascending to the sealed bid. They will bid
on the ascending so long as the actual price di¤erential pt(A) ¡ pt(SB) is less than this threshold.
If we make a reasonable speci…cation of probabilistic, rather than deterministic choice, ±i can be
estimated for each subject by …nding the ±i that solves the following:
max
±i
TX
t=1
[2½¤(t) ¡
2X
j=1
½2j ] (1)
½(ct) =
8><>:
e±i¡(pt(A)¡pt(SB))
1+e±i¡(pt(A)¡pt(SB)) if ct = A
1 ¡ e±i¡(pt(A)¡pt(SB))
1+e±i¡(pt(A)¡pt(SB)) if ct = SB
This speci…cation is essentially minimizing the mean squared deviation of the predictions. Since
many of the predicted probabilities will be close to 0 and 1, this speci…cation should be expected
to be superior to a standard log-likelihood speci…cation7.
The ±i for each subject represents the price di¤erential that will make them prefer to choose the
sealed bid institution. To obtain the actual price for the ascending auction at which this switch-over
should be observed we must add 1.4 as this is the static price for the sealed bid auction. The results
from such an estimation are summarized in …gure 2. Note that the few negative observations in the
graph represent those bidders who preferred the sealed bid auction in periods 1-10. The average
price that lead people to switch from the ascending to the sealed bid is 5.95 (6. 61 considering
only those evidencing a preference for the ascending auction in periods 1-10) while the average
pro…t di¤erence between the two institutions was 8. 62 leading to a implied switch-over price of
10. 02 if the subjects were only concerned about average pro…ts. This leads to the same conclusion
that was implied by the pseudo demand curve above which is that subjects were willing to pay
signi…cantly less than would be implied by the expected payo¤ di¤erential alone. The expected
7See Selten (1998) and Friedman (1983) for a discussion of the problems of using a log-likelihood function for this
sort of a problem.
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Figure 2: Estimated price at which subjects chose to switch from ascending to sealed bid.
payo¤ di¤erential is of course a very crude measure of what a bidder should be willing to pay and
will be improved on in the next section.
Based upon the demand curve seen in …gure 1 it is clear that the subjects were not displaying
purely monotonic preferences. It is important then to get some characterization of the degree to
which the choices of the subjects were consistent and purposeful instead of random. If bidders were
perfectly consistent in their choices, we would expect to see one of two patterns to their choices.
One is maintaining a constant choice throughout the second phase, such as a choice path consisting
of all A’s. A second would be choosing the ascending auction up to some price and then switching
once and for all to the sealed bid, which we might represent as an A-SB path. It might also
be reasonable to …nd that preferences are somewhat probabilistic and when the two auctions are
roughly equal in expected utility the subjects choose randomly. This would lead to a reasonable
expectation that say for a price of 2.8 a bidder is observed choosing the ascending, 3.5 sealed bid,
switching back to the ascending at the next price and sealed bid at the one above that and then
staying constant for the rest. This would be three switches and can be described as an A-SB-A-SB
12
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Number of Switches
0
5
10
15
20
Figure 3: Histogram showing the number of subjects switching each number of times. Note that
the mass on a number is shown to the right of it.
path. In fact the median number of switches was 3 (average 2.92, mode 1) with the histogram in
…gure 3 detailing the full distribution of the number of times subjects switched their choice from
one auction format to the next as the entry price increased. The way this graph is set up, the mass
or line to the right of a number is the number of subjects switching that number of times.
The way to interpret this graph is that the more switches a person has, the more random is
their decision making. The distribution follows a relatively standard exponential decay with half
of the mass on 1 and 3 and then trailing o¤ sharply after that. Those switching more than 5 or 6
times are choosing fairly randomly and there are a very small number of even switches.
Of course, observing even just three switches does not necessarily imply roughly consistent
choices as described above since three switches may also be the result of a far less consistent choice
sequence. An example would be something like the following:
Entry Price 2.8 3.5-7.7 8.4-9.1 10.5-
Choice A SB A SB
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Whereas the initial example of a three switch bid path seems perfectly reasonable and consistent
with a probabilistic choice model, this one is a little more di¢cult to rationalize that way. Why
would a person not pay 3.5 for the ascending auction but pay 8.4? If most of the switching behavior
looked like this second example, it would be di¢cult to conclude that subjects were being systematic
about their choices. As it turns out, of the 14 subjects who switched three times, that is had an
A-SB-A-SB path, 7 chose the ascending only once in the second A phase while 5 chose it twice.8
Either of which are fairly consistent with the idea of a random mistake.
Another measure of consistency could be subjects’ choices in the second part of the preference
testing phase for the entry price that was less than 1.4. Recall that in the …rst 10 periods, the entry
prices for both auction types was 1.4 and the static price of the less preferred auction remained
1.4 in the next 20 periods. If a subject evidenced a preference for the ascending auction for equal
prices, consistent choice behavior would imply that they make the same choice if the entry price
on the ascending auction is lower than the entry price on the sealed bid. There was one such entry
price in the grid to check for this property and this held true for 94% of all subjects.
A …nal measure of consistency of choices can be derived by looking at how many times the
estimated ±i’s predict the choice of the subject accurately. The mean number of correct predictions
is 24.7 and median is 25. The number of choices each bidder had was 27. So for half of the subjects,
our estimate is only misses at most 2 out of 27 choices. Overall we can conclude that the observed
choice sequences are in most cases purposeful and consistent with a probabilistic choice model.
3.3 What can account for the observed willingness to pay?
There are a couple of obvious things to check to see if they can account for the observed di¤erences
in willingness to pay. One might think that preferences over auction institutions would be formed
by outcomes from the learning phase of the experiment. Subjects who ended up with higher pro…ts
8For the two remaining subjects with three switches as well as the three subjects with four switches no reasonable
explanation was found. Those switches were not in‡uenced either by the fact that the auction before the switch was
actually played or if the subjects had won the previous auction (if it was played) or not (which results in negative
payo¤s).
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Value Std. Error t-value Pr(>jtj)
Intercept -15.32 20.03 -0.76 0.45
Treatment -3.94 1.94 -2.03 0.05
Avg Sealed bid Pro…t 0.11 0.29 0.37 0.71
% Sealed bid wins -0.57 6.25 -0.09 0.93
Avg A Pro…t 0.15 0.26 0.60 0.55
% A wins -2.25 10.29 -0.22 0.83
Session Sealed bid Pro…t -0.82 0.87 -0.95 0.35
Session A Pro…t 1.70 1.34 1.27 0.21
R2= 0:134 F-Stat 1.16 p-val 0.34
Table 1: Regression results of regressing these parameters on observed switch-over price.
in the ascending auction may have been more willing to pay for it or perhaps those who won
more often in the sealed bid auction would be less willing to pay for the ascending auction and so
forth. While the design of the experiment attempts to control for these e¤ects, the correlations
between the outcomes of the two auction types are not as perfect as one might expect (coe¢cient
of correlation is .65 between average pro…t in both institutions and .57 for probability of winning).
Another likely possibility would be the treatment e¤ect of whether or not the subjects saw the
summary statistics from the results in the training phase. While it is unclear how this might e¤ect
the outcome, it seems possible that it could. The results from a regression of such things on the
observed switch-over prices, ±i + 1:4; are contained in table 1.
As the table shows, only the treatment variable is potentially important as all the others are
statistically insigni…cant. As it turns out though, the hairline signi…cance of the treatment vari-
able is being driven by a few outliers. By chance, the one very low willingness to pay and the
few very high ones were observed in di¤erent treatments. If these observations are left out, the
signi…cance disappears. As already noted, some of these regressors are strongly correlated but the
signi…cance of each parameter does not change if this regression is performed with subsets of the
variables to eliminate the problem. The combined regression was presented simply for compactness
of presentation.
These results show that the heterogeneity in observed willingness to pay does not seem to be
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derived from the fact that di¤erent bidders experienced di¤erent results during the training phase.
That is actually an encouraging result as theoretically, these variables should not have any impact
on these decisions. This leaves us with the likelihood that the observed di¤erences were based upon
unobserved heterogeneity in preferences of the bidders rather than upon the observed heterogeneity
of their experiences. One possible source of this preference heterogeneity is in the risk preferences
of the subjects.
A casual examination of the bids observed in the sealed bid auctions, reveals the standard
pattern observed in most sealed bid auction experiments which is bids far in excess of those predicted
by the risk neutral Nash equilibrium. This might suggest that bidders possessed some form of
risk averse preferences as represented in their bidding behavior and this risk aversion may have
in‡uenced their choice of auction formats. Since the constant relative risk averse (CRRA) utility
function, u(x) = x®; also satis…es DARA, we would seem justi…ed in the use of this utility function
to represent the preferences of the bidders since as we previously discussed Matthews (1987) shows
that bidders possessing DARA preferences will prefer the ascending auction just as our subjects
did. Using this utility function, we can then estimate the risk preferences of the bidders based upon
their bids in the sealed bid auctions and generate predictions of the switch-over prices that bidders
would have had, were their choices guided by the same risk attitudes they exhibited in their bidding
behavior. This predicted switch-over price is computed by …nding an entry price for the ascending
auction that makes the expected utility of participating in the two di¤erent auction formats equal
given that the entry price for the sealed bid auction was 1.4. Due to the length of the equations
for performing these calculations, they and partial derivations can be found in the appendix.
There are two important issues involved in performing these calculations. The most obvious
involves the fact that when someone loses an auction yet still pays an entry price, their utility
is (¡e)® where e is the entry price they paid. Since taking roots of negative numbers leads to
problems, we must use some measure of wealth to add into the utility function to insure a positive
argument. What to use for this measure of wealth is certain to be a controversial issue. We will
primarily use two di¤erent measures of wealth with the …rst being the cash balances of the subject
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at the end of the …rst phase and the second being that amount divided by ten. This latter measure
is essentially constructed to be the smallest wealth measure we can use, the amounts typically
correspond to about $0.50-$1.00, and still be able to evaluate the equations. We will refer to this
as the “no wealth” case for convenience as this is the closest approximation to that situation that
can be obtained.
The second issue deals with the expectations subjects have regarding the risk attitudes of their
opponents in sealed bid auctions. We will examine two speci…cations with the …rst being that
subjects assume any potential opponent will have the same risk preference as themselves (the
“equivalent opponent” case) and the second in which they assume their opponent will possess the
average degree of risk aversion in the population (the “average opponent” case). The equivalent
opponent case might be taken as a simple heuristic for when the subject has no information on
likely opponents and therefore assumes they are the same as themselves. Since the auction choice
behavior occurs after observing aggregate results from the …rst phase of the auction though, it
might be more reasonable to assume that bidders have developed some intuition about the degree
of risk aversion of likely opponents or even just the average rate at which they bid below value.
While we could use the actual empirical distribution as their beliefs for this case, that would be
overly cumbersome and likely not obtain better results than modeling subjects as though they
assume their opponent possesses the average level of risk aversion in the population.
As derived in the appendix, the bid functions for sealed bid auctions under these two belief
systems are largely the same, b(v) = 11+®v: The only di¤erence comes in when bidders who are
more risk averse than the average would be bidding more than the maximum the person with
average risk aversion would be willing to bid, b(100) = 11+¹®(100), allowing ¹® to represent the
average level of risk aversion in the population. The key di¤erence in these two cases that will drive
the results is that the expected probabilities of winning for a given value are di¤erent between the
two cases. In the equivalent opponent case, a bidder’s expected probability of winning is just F (v):
Since the bid function is monotonic in value, they win if their value is higher than their opponents.
If they believe they are facing someone of average risk aversion, ¹®; then the bid function is no
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longer purely monotonic in value. Someone with a lower value could bid higher than someone with
a higher value if the former is more risk averse. Thus the expected probability of winning becomes
F (1+¹®1+®v): Those more risk averse than average (® < ¹®) will expect to win with higher probability
relative to F (v) and those less risk averse expect to win with lower probability.
Risk aversion parameters can be estimated by running a standard OLS regression with the
equation bi = ¯ +°vi where ° = 11+® as is developed in Cox, Roberson, and Smith (1982) and Cox,
Smith, and Walker (1988). Doing so yields a distribution of risk aversion parameters with an average
of 0.669 which is what will be used as ¹® in the calculations below. For the equivalent opponent
model this is a correctly speci…ed estimation. For the average opponent case, the estimated bid
function is an approximation only, due to the existence of the ‡at region for bids above 11+¹®(100) =
1
1+:66(100) = 60: 241: A bidder will be predicted to bid 60.241 anytime their value is such that
1
1+®(v) ¸ 60:241: For some extremely risk averse bidder, say ® = :3; this threshold value is, e.g.,
78.313. For only about half of the subjects is this ever an issue, those more risk averse than average,
and even for them, this ‡at portion of the bid function covers a relatively small range of the value
space. Thus the bias introduced by ignoring this in the estimations should not be expected to be
severe while keeping the same risk aversion values throughout the analysis aids in continuity of
exposition.
One might suggest that since we have put wealth into the utility function for auction choice,
we should also have wealth in the utility function for bidding in sealed bid auctions and thus for
estimating risk aversion. We have done so, but will not present either the methods or details of the
results here to conserve space. We have chosen to omit the results for two reasons. First is that
the general nature of our conclusions do not appear to change. Second, the average degree of risk
aversion is estimated to be -19.05 (requires changing the utility function to u(x) = x®=® to allow for
negative values of ®) assuming subjects consider their wealth to be their cash balance at the time
of the bid plus show-up fee in the experiment. We believe this is simply an incomprehensibly large
9As a technical note, there were only 8 out of the 60 bidders who possessed intercepts that were statistically
signi…cant at the 5% level. Excluding these 8 yields an average ® of 0.60.
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degree of risk aversion and indicates a speci…cation bias in the utility function from the addition
of wealth. This is related to, though importantly not the same as, the problems with the standard
risk aversion model discussed in Rabin and Thaler (2001)10.
Based on the discussion above, we could construct four di¤erent models for generating predicted
switch-over prices by combining the two di¤erent wealth speci…cations and two di¤erent belief
speci…cations. We will concentrate on only two of those and just describe generally the results from
the other two. The …rst model we will examine is the Wealth-Equivalent Opponent model and
the second will be No Wealth-Average Opponent model. We can treat these as assumptions about
how subjects form their decisions and compare the predictions of these two models to their actual
decisions to determine which is a better model of subject behavior.
Using the Wealth-Equivalent Opponent model to generate predicted switch-over prices yields
results that can be seen in …gure 4. This …gure shows a scatterplot of the actual observed switch-over
prices, the previously estimated ±i+1:4 values, plotted against the estimated levels of risk aversion
with a regression line. Overlaid onto this is the scatterplot of the predicted switch-over prices
according to this model against the estimated risk aversion levels. This graph and the subsequent
analysis leaves out those 5 subjects who indicated a preference for the sealed bid auction in periods
1-10 and those few bidders who were found to have risk loving preferences or ® > 1. Excluding both
sets of bidders leaves 46 in the sample set. The relationship between risk aversion and predicted
switch-over price is negative as bidders who are highly risk averse should expect to make very little
money in a sealed bid auction should therefore be willing to pay more to enter an ascending auction.
A regression of the predicted switch-over price on the estimated risk aversion parameter, ®; yields
10 It is important to note that the speci…c problem reported in Rabin and Thaler (2001) does not actually apply
to the risk aversion model as applied to bidding behavior. The easiest way to see this is that the loss aversion
model proposed to “…x” the problem is the same as the risk aversion model we have used in this context as losses
are not possible. More generally, both the results reported here and those in the Rabin and Thaler (2001) paper
seem to suggest that the more reasonable interpretation of both is not that the risk aversion model is not applicable
but rather that the problem is in the assumption that people always consider their external wealth position in any
decision. Removing this assumption leaves us with reasonable levels of risk aversion here and would do the same for
the examples in Rabin and Thaler (2001). Of course a complete discussion of this issue goes well beyond the scope
of this paper and those unconvinced by this short note are directed to Cox and Sadiraj (2002) for a more in-depth
examination of these issues.
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Figure 4: Scatterplot of both observed and predicted switchover prices using the
Wealth-Equivalent Opponent model against estimated risk aversion parameter for each individual.
a highly signi…cant coe¢cient of -13.7211.
Comparing these results to the relationship between the observed switch-over prices and the
estimated risk aversion levels should make it clear that the Wealth-Equivalent Opponent model does
not explain the data well at all. Recall that these were the prices at which the bidders actually
did switch from choosing the ascending auction to the sealed bid. A regression of the observed
switch-over price on the estimated level of risk aversion yields a coe¢cient of -1.03 which has a
resulting p-value of 0.7612 indicating a lack of signi…cance. These results indicate that there is
no observed relationship between actual switch-over prices and estimated degree of risk aversion.
Further, there are very few bidders who possessed switch-over prices that were predicted well by
this model.
Figure 5 shows the corresponding scatterplot from generating the predicted switch-over prices
with the No Wealth-Average Opponent model. The primary di¤erence in the predicted relationship
11The t-statistic on this coe¢cient is -42.42 and p-value is 0.0000. For completeness, the value of the intercept is
13.85 with a t-statistic of 76.75 and p-value of 0.0000.
12The intercept in the regression had a value of 6.87, t-statistic of 3.66 and p-value of 0.0007.
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Figure 5: Scatterplot of both observed and predicted switchover prices using the No
Wealth-Average Opponent model against estimated risk aversion parameter for each individual.
from the previous one is that the regression line is rotated signi…cantly to the left, making the overall
relationship much ‡atter. The regression coe¢cient on the risk aversion parameter is now -3.21 with
a P-value of 0.0000. Bidders who are quite risk averse are predicted to be willing to pay much less
while bidders close to risk neutral are predicted to pay a little more. The reason for this di¤erence
is found in the di¤erent expected probability of winning resulting from the change in beliefs. For
bidders who are quite a bit more risk averse than the average, they expect their probability of
winning to be high. While they expect to make little surplus, the expected probability of getting
the surplus is very high and this causes the sealed bid auction to be very appealing relative to
the more risky yet lucrative ascending auction. Thus even highly risk averse bidders would not
be willing to pay much to enter into the ascending auction. Overall 24(11) of the 46 bidders have
predicted and actual switch-over prices that are di¤erent by less than 2(1) ECU according to the
No Wealth-Average Opponent model which compares to only 17(10) for the Wealth-Equivalent
Opponent model. Formal signi…cance tests of these relationships are di¢cult due to the derivation
of the predicted switch-over prices, but this comparison should be indicative that the NoWealth-
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Average Opponent model would perform a bit better.
For completeness, we can point out that the predicted switch-over prices derived from the
other two potential models (No Wealth-Equivalent Opponent and Wealth-Average Opponent) are
practically identical to each other and lead to regression lines that are about half way in rotation
between the other two.13
From examining these …gures it would appear that the No Wealth-Average Opponent model
works fairly well at matching the behavior of one class of the subjects, but there is another class of
subjects who exhibit a willingness to pay far in excess of what their risk preferences alone would
predict.
Combining these results with the results from estimating risk aversion levels allowing for bidders
to consider their wealth position seems to indicate support for the hypothesis that bidders tend to
ignore their wealth position when making both bidding and auction entry decisions. At …rst glance
this would appear to be contradicted by the results found in the more careful analysis of the e¤ect
of wealth on bidding behavior in Ham, Kagel, and Lehrer (2002). While an analysis of the bids in
our experiments also demonstrates a statistically signi…cant relationship between cash balances and
bidding behavior it is either a: much smaller than would be predicted by theory assuming bidders
consider only the wealth earned in the experiment or b: much larger than would likely be predicted
by theory assuming bidders consider the entirety of their external wealth. The …rst is supported
by the fact that when wealth is 0 or small as it would be in the …rst part of an experiment, bidders
with negative risk aversion parameters, as are found when wealth is in the bid function, either bid
above their value for values of ¡1 < ® < 0 or below 0 for ® < ¡1; with the bid level changing
signi…cantly as wealth is accumulated. None of these predictions are observed to any signi…cant
degree. The latter claim is supported by the fact that if a subject has several hundred dollars in
external wealth, the dollar or so at stake in each auction would be trivial in comparison so the
impact on total wealth and thereby the impact on bidding behavior of winning a dollar in the
13We can also note that if we use a wealth speci…cation of the subjects’ phase I wealth multiplied by 100 to capture
the possibility that the subjects consider their external wealth in making these decisions, the corresponding regression
lines rotate to the right and shift up, getting farther from matching the data.
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experiment should be virtually undetectable. This suggests that while bidders likely do somehow
allow their cash balances to impact their behavior it does not appear to do so in quite the same
way or degree as this model predicts. Thus we do not view our results and those in Ham, Kagel,
and Lehrer (2002) as contradictory on this matter, as we are not suggesting that there is truly no
impact on decisions from wealth, only that the impact is in a di¤erent form or degree than would
be appropriate to model in this structure.
The additional result appears to be that subjects do form expectations in regard to something
that approximates the degree of risk aversion of their opponent and this impacts their choice of
which auction to enter. We, of course, …nd it highly implausible that the subjects view their beliefs
as beliefs about the likely risk aversion of their opponent, but we do …nd it plausible that they form
beliefs about the likely bidding behavior, perhaps bid/value ratio, of their opponent for which we
are able to use risk aversion as a suitable proxy. This is quite reasonable since after each sealed bid
auction they are informed about both the bid and value of the winner. We are certainly aware of
and sympathetic to the many problems that have been noted in the literature in regard to using
risk aversion as a model of behavior in auctions, but it is the simplest way of specifying a common
decision structure across both choice environments and seems to …t with the observed behavior
quite well.
A plausible explanation for the fact that many bidders appear to be willing to pay more for
the ascending auction than they “should” is that for various reasons participating in the sealed bid
auction incurs a certain amount of disutility. This disutility could come from the extra e¤ort that is
required to …gure out how to determine a bidding strategy, the mental anguish over seeing someone
else win with a bid lower than your value or any number of other factors.14 We can use the results
above to obtain an estimate of this disutility. We will model this disutility using a parameter ¸
that will be considered to be the equivalent of an extra entry price for the sealed bid auction in the
utility function. Thus when a bidder wins a sealed bid auction, their utility is (W + v ¡ b¡ e+¸)®
14We did conduct a short post-experimental questionnaire on this issue and subjects gave the following main reasons
for preferring the ascending auction: (i) higher payo¤s, (ii) easier decision-problem, (iii) decision independent from
what others do, (iv) avoidance of the risk to lose by bidding too low, and (v) no uncertainty.
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and when the bidder loses, (W ¡ e+¸)®: We could of course frame this willingness to pay as based
upon extra utility from participating in the ascending auction, but the previous formulation seems
more natural and identi…cation problems preclude simultaneously identifying both. To …nd the
value of ¸ for each bidder, we will use the No Wealth-Average bidder model and solve for the value
of ¸ that makes the bidder indi¤erent between the sealed bid auction at an entry price of 1.4 and
the ascending auction at their observed switch-over price, ±i + 1:4 given their estimated degree of
risk aversion. Details can again be found in the appendix.
For some bidders, ¸ will be negative indicating a disutility for the sealed bid auction while for
others ¸ could be positive. These will obviously correspond to bidders who were found to be willing
to pay more/less than the theoretical prediction. A histogram summary of the ¸0s found in the
population can be seen in …gure 6. Most of the mass in the population is between 2 and -2. There
are only a few subjects who possess a ¸ > 2 (8) while quite a number possess a ¸ < ¡2 (15) and
some signi…cantly so. This matches with the results found in …gure 5 showing relatively few and
only minor over-predictions of switch-over prices yet a number of large under-predictions.
It is di¢cult to understand exactly what this ¸ means in its raw form. It is therefore useful to
translate ¸ into a di¤erent measure of the degree to which subjects prefer the ascending auction to
the sealed bid. The most natural such measure would be to …nd the n-bidder ascending auction
that is utility equivalent to the 2-bidder sealed bid auction. To do that we solve for the bN that
makes the expected utility of being in a sealed bid auction, assuming the computed value of ¸ for
the bidder, equal to the expected value of being in an n-bidder ascending auction. Details on how
this calculation is done are found in the appendix. There were 25 bidders found to have a ¸ < 0
out of the 46 who were found to be risk averse and not prefer the sealed bid auction. Of these 25
bidders, only 2 were found to possess an bN = 2; 14 had an bN = 3; 3 with bN = 4; 1 with bN = 5; 1
with bN = 9 and 4 bidders were found to have values of bN that were essentially arbitrarily large15.
This measure of the degree to which a bidder prefers an ascending auction is quite strong due to
15Possible values out to 40 were checked and the ascending still generated higher utility. Since expected values
vary so little at this point and beyond it was considered not worthwhile to search at higher values.
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Figure 6: Histogram of the estimated values of ¸; or value of participating in a sealed bid
auction, found for the subjects.
the very large jump in expected value between a 2 and 3 bidder auction. Thus the fact that so
many bidders would be willing to participate in ascending auctions with larger numbers of bidders
even when they could participate in a 2 bidder sealed bid auction indicates quite strong preferences
for the ascending auction.
4 Conclusion
In this study we attempt to do two things. First, we try to develop a methodology capable of
measuring bidder preferences for various attributes of an auction design. Second, we apply this
methodology to looking at bidder preferences between sealed bid and ascending auctions. The
methodology involves the use of a two phase experiment protocol. In the …rst phase, the learning
or training phase, subjects participate in both auction types, to make sure that the subjects have
some idea for how the relevant characteristics of the di¤erent auction formats e¤ect the outcome. To
enhance learning, after each auction, the results of the winner for both auction types were published.
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At the end of the learning phase in some of the sessions there was a summary screen detailing the
average pro…t achieved by the winners across both auction types while in other sessions this screen
was not included. Having sessions run with and without this screen allowed us to determine whether
it had any e¤ect on the relevant behavior. Theoretically these feedback di¤erences are irrelevant and
the results demonstrate that they appear to be so. The second phase, the preference assessment
phase, begins by trying to detect which mechanism each subject prefers under a ceteris paribus
assumption by allowing subjects to choose to enter into either an ascending or sealed bid auction
for the same price. The phase continues by using these initial choices to identify the preferred
format and then assess the strength of this preference by randomly varying the entry price for the
more preferred format to …nd the switch-over point or entry price such that below it the subject
would choose their more preferred option, but above it they switch to the less preferred, but cheaper,
option.
The results show that when the entry prices for the two auction institutions are equal, subjects
overwhelmingly prefer the ascending auction. However, the revealed willingness to pay for that
preference in the second phase is much lower than the average realized pro…t di¤erential between
the two auction mechanisms. The average price that lead subjects to switch from the ascending
to the sealed bid auction is 5.95 while the average pro…t di¤erential between the two institutions
is 8. 62 leading to a implied switch-over price of 10.02, accounting for the static entry price on the
sealed bid auction. One hypothesis of subject behavior is that they are more or less risk neutral
and bidding above the risk neutral Nash equilibrium level in the sealed bid auctions is a function
of some phenomenon other than risk aversion. Were that true, it would have been reasonable to
expect bidders to have paid up to the 10.02 level for the ascending auction since below that level
the expected pro…t from the ascending is greater than the expected pro…t from the sealed bid. Thus
we were forced to search for an alternative explanation.
We …rst tried to explain the observed switch-over prices either through experiential data con-
cerning the subjects experiences in the learning phase. Data on the individual outcomes from phase
I had no real explanatory power over the observed switch-over prices. We therefore tried modeling
26
the subjects choosing as if they possessed risk averse preferences. When modeling the subjects
behavior as though they assumed their opponent behaved as themselves and that they considered
their wealth position when deciding on which auction format to enter, the predicted results from
these hypotheses bore little resemblance to the actual results in the experiment. When modeling
the subjects as though they believed they were facing a bidder of average risk aversion and consid-
ered just enough wealth to pay the entry price, the behavior of one group of the subjects became
predicted rather well while the rest of the subjects were all found to be willing to pay far more
than they “should" have based on this decision model.
We then went on to try to characterize what this relatively high willingness to pay on the part of
the subjects really meant. To an auction designer, the important implication would be that bidders
would be willing to enter an ascending auction with a larger number of bidders than a smaller sealed
bid auction as if they would do so, the auctioneer might expect to make more revenue with the
ascending auction. The results indicated that most of the bidders would be willing to enter into
ascending auctions with at least 3-4 bidders instead of a 2 bidder sealed bid auction. Considering
the sizable expected value di¤erence in going from a 2 bidder to a 3 or 4 bidder auction, this
suggests very strong preferences. Were the sealed bid auction a 4-bidder auction, the implication
is that a sizable portion of the subjects would be willing to participate in ascending auctions of
much larger size rather than participate in the sealed bid auction. This is an important result for
auctioneers who want to attract bidders to their auctions.
There is, of course, a way of looking at our results that would suggest much less signi…cance
to them. This is derived from the results found in Isaac and James (2000) as in that paper
the authors attempt to estimate the risk aversion parameters possessed by subjects using two
di¤erent procedures (sealed bid auctions and the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak procedure) and …nd
the estimations obtained using both of these procedures to be quite di¤erent. The implication
is that either risk preferences are not invariant between choice mechanisms or perhaps that the
bidding behavior in auctions is truly not a function of risk aversion. Either would suggest that
our attempt to measure risk preferences in the sealed bid auction behavior and use that to predict
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behavior in the auction choice setting is doomed to failure. These experiments do not allow us to
adequately deal with such an argument, but in future work we will be subjecting the predictions
on entry behavior this model suggests to detailed tests to determine if they are robust.
One might also reasonably propose that the auction choice behavior we observe in these exper-
iments is derived from loss averse preferences. Since subjects must pay the entry fee in the event
they enter an auction and lose, subjects might avoid entering an auction with a high entry fee even
if the expected value from doing so is higher than entering the other to avoid the large possible loss.
We have conducted a series of sessions with a variant of our experimental design that is identical
to the version explained here except that the entry price has been replaced by a percentage tax on
the surplus of the winner which can never cause a loss. In these experiments, the average pro…t
in the learning phase for the …rst price auctions was 16.48 and for the ascending it was 34.18.
Thus subjects should have been willing to pay up to a tax of 1 ¡ 16:48=34:18 or 52% to be in the
ascending as all lower taxes leave them better o¤ on average in the ascending with no possibility
of losses. We observed only 13 out of 50 subjects willing to pay .48 and 9 out of 50 willing to pay
.52 and the overall structure of the willingness to pay the tax looks strikingly similar to what was
shown in …gure 1. This is only a preliminary look at the issue and it will receive additional scrutiny
in future study. This should, however, be a very strong indication that loss aversion is not likely
to be the true cause of the phenomenon we study here.
There is a …nal important insight that can be derived from the observed willingness to pay of
most of the bidders in regard to entry prices for their preferred auction. Many optimal auction
designs (see, e.g., Bulow and Roberts (1989), Riley and Samuelson (1981)) rely upon the use
of properly chosen entry prices for full surplus extraction. The theories generally rely on the
assumption of a …xed pool of bidders. Our results cast doubt on the true optimality of those
designs for cases in which bidders have alternative options. If the bidders have an alternative
option and if the entry price is too high, they may well take advantage of it. The results have not
been included above to conserve space, but if we were to consider these experiments an attempt to
determine if adding an entry fee to the ascending auction would increase revenue, the answer would
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be a clear “no”. Total revenue in the ascending auction is almost monotonically decreasing in the
entry price. The reason for that is that while per auction revenue is increasing in the entry price,
the auctioneer will be able to conduct fewer and fewer of these auctions as the entry price rises since
more bidders will be pursuing their outside options. The latter e¤ect outweighs the former leading
to total revenue decreasing as the entry price rises. These results show that entry prices do not have
to be very high in order to scare o¤ would-be bidders even when those bidders have a signi…cant
preference for the more expensive mechanism. These results con…rm the theoretical predictions
derived by Levin and Smith (1994) that the optimal design for the seller in private value auctions
is one without an entry fee, though for di¤erent reasons. It has yet to be determined de…nitively,
however, if the preferences observed in the current study do lead to an auctioneer being able to
increase revenue by attracting more bidders to an ascending auction. This too will be veri…ed in
future work.
APPENDIX A: Computation of Expected Utilities
For the data analysis below we will need to be able to compute the expected utility of the bidders
for choosing to enter a sealed bid auction and their expected utility for entering an ascending auction
given entry prices for both. The use of entry prices poses something of a complication to this as if
the subjects lose the auction, or win with a low surplus, they face the possibility of a loss. We can
therefore not represent a subjects utility from winning the auction as u(v¡b¡e) and must introduce
wealth into the equation to avoid the negativity problem and use u(W + v ¡ b¡ e). However, when
bidders are deciding what to bid in the sealed bid auction we will be ignoring wealth e¤ects.
Sealed Bid
The …rst thing that we need to do is derive the bidding function under the two di¤erent models of
beliefs: equivalent opponent and average opponent. As shown in Cox, Roberson, and Smith (1982),
the optimal bid function for a risk averse bidder in the SIPV environment assuming that values
are uniformly distributed on the range [0; 100] can be de…ned by b¤(v) = v
³
N¡1
N¡1+®
´
so long as
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b < 100
¡N¡1
N
¢
: Above this point, the bid function becomes non-linear. This non-linearity is due to
allowing that bidders may believe that their opponents have di¤erent risk aversion parameters than
themselves. If, however, bidders assume their opponents have the same risk aversion parameters as
themselves, then the bid function is
b¤(v) = v N ¡ 1
N ¡ 1 + ® (2)
for the entire range of possible values. Thus this is the bid function for the equivalent opponent
model. For the average opponent model, assuming the average risk aversion parameter is ¹®, the
bid function is:
b¤(v) =
8><>: v
N¡1
N¡1+® for v 2 [0; min(N¡1+®n¡1+¹® ¤ 100; 100)]
100 N¡1N¡1+¹® for v 2 [min(N¡1+®N¡1+¹® ¤ 100; 100); 100]
(3)
Equivalent bidder model: For n = 2 if a bidder draws value v; they will bid v1+® : We
will add a parameter ¸ to allow for a possible extra boost to utility or perhaps a disutility from
participating in sealed bid auctions. The utility from the outcome when the bidder wins will
be
³
W + v ¡ v1+® ¡ e + ¸
´®
=
³
W + ®1+®v ¡ e + ¸
´®
and loses (W ¡ e + ¸)® : Expected utility
will be
³
W + ®1+®v ¡ e + ¸
´®
times probability that they win, F (v) = v+1101 as we are using the
discrete uniform distribution on [0; 100]; plus (W ¡ e + ¸)® times probability that you don’t all
times the probability of that particular v occurring, 1101 . This gives us that the expected utility
from participating in a sealed bid auction can be de…ned by the following equation:
EUES (W;e;®; ¸) =
100X
v=0
0B@
³
W + ®1+®v ¡ e + ¸
´®
v+1
101 ¤ 1101
+(W ¡ e + ¸)® (1 ¡ v+1101 ) ¤ 1101
1CA (4)
Average bidder model: The expected utility under this model is computed much the same
way except for two details. One is the technical detail coming from the two part bid function. The
second is derived from the fact that the probability of winning is no longer just F (v): Now if you
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bid bi assuming that your opponent is bidding N¡1N¡1+¹®vj , then
Pr(win) = Pr(bi > bj =
N ¡ 1
N ¡ 1 + ¹®vj) = Pr(
N ¡ 1 + ¹®
N ¡ 1 bi > vj)
= F (
N ¡ 1 + ¹®
N ¡ 1 bi)
n¡1 =
Ã
N¡1+¹®
N¡1 bi + 1
101
!n¡1
If bi = v N¡1N¡1+® then this becomes
Ã
N¡1+¹®
N¡1 bi + 1
101
!N¡1
=
0@³N¡1+¹®N¡1 ´ v ³ N¡1N¡1+®´ + 1
101
1An¡1 =
0@v ³N¡1+¹®N¡1+®´ + 1
101
1AN¡1
At least this is your probability of winning along the sloped portion of the bid function. Along the
‡at portion of the bid function, your belief is that your opponent will never bid above 100 N¡1N¡1+¹®
thus if you bid that plus ²; you expect to win with a probability of 1.
The expected utility of participating in a sealed bid auction assuming you are facing a bidder
with risk aversion of ¹® is then:
EUAS (W;e;®; ¸) =
min( 1+®1+¹® (100);100)X
v=0
0B@
³
W + ®1+®v + ¸ ¡ e
´® ¤ 1+¹®1+®v+1101 ¤ 1101+
(W + ¸ ¡ e)® ¤ (1 ¡ 1+¹®1+®v+1101 ) ¤ 1101
1CA +
100X
v=min( 1+®1+¹® (100);100)
µµ
W + v ¡ 1
1 + ¹®
(100) + ¸ ¡ e
¶®
¤ 1 ¤ 1
101
¶
Ascending
In an ascending auction the risk attitude of your opponent is irrelevant thus either model of
expectations produces the same result. For a given value v; a bidder will pay the next high-
est value if they do win or their utility will be (W + v ¡ v(2) ¡ e)®: The distribution of v(2)
is given by the standard distribution of an order statistic for the k’th highest draw, f(k)(x) =
(n)!
(n¡k)!(k¡1)!F (x)n¡k[1 ¡ F (x)]k¡1f(x); for the case in which x is drawn from the discrete uniform
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distribution on [0; v], k = 1 and n = N ¡ 1, N being the actual number of bidders in the auction.
This simpli…es to (N ¡ 1)
³
x+1
v+1
´N¡2
1
v+1 : To …nd the expected value of being in the ascending
auction, we must …rst compute the expected surplus that occurs when the bidder wins multiplied
by the probability of winning and then we add on a second term for the case in which the bidder
loses: Since we will be allowing for the possibility of more than 2 bidders in the ascending auctions,
we have to generalize the format. Assuming that ¹ represents the extra utility or disutility from
participating in the ascending auction, this leads to
EUA(W;®; e; ¹;N) =
100X
v=0
0BBBB@
µPv
x=0 (W + v ¡ x ¡ e + ¹)® ¤ (N ¡ 1)
³
x+1
v+1
´N¡2
1
v+1
¶
¤ ¡v+1101 ¢N¡1 ¤ 1101
+(W ¡ e + ¹)® (1 ¡ ¡v+1101 ¢N¡1) ¤ 1101
1CCCCA (5)
Comparing
In the experiments, it was observed that for equal entry prices most bidders preferred the
ascending auction. The entry price for the sealed bid auction is then held static at 1.4 while the
entry price of the ascending auction is increased until we …nd a point that the bidder prefers to
choose the sealed bid auction. Given a level of risk aversion, ®; and a level of wealth, W; it is
possible to compute predictions as to what this price should be from both models by solving the
following equations for e; assuming that ¸ and ¹ are both 0.
EUES (W; 1:4; ®; 0) = EUA(W;e; ®; 0; 2) (6)
EUAS (W; 1:4; ®; 0) = EUA(W;e; ®; 0; 2) (7)
As described in the body of the paper, the No Wealth-Average bidder model is then used to
identify the level of (dis)utility from participating in the sealed bid auctions. This is the entry price
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equivalent of what would make the expected utility of participating in a sealed bid auction equal
to the expected utility of being in the ascending at the entry price the subject was observed to pay,
±i + 1:4: This is done by …nding the value of ¸ that solves the following:
EUAS (W; 1:4; ®; ¸) = EUA(W;±i + 1:4; ®; 0; 2) (8)
Finally, the n¡bidder ascending auction a bidder …nds equivalent to participating in a two bidder
sealed bid auction assuming entry prices of 0 for both is found by solving the following for bN :
EUAS (W; 0; ®; ¸) = EUA(W; 0; ®; 0; bN) (9)
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